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Why did Speaker of the House John Boehner face the largest intraparty challenge to an incumbent 
speaker in over 150 years in January 2015? Goal salience theory will be used to explain this event. 
In addition, since this protest took place during the public vote for speaker and not during a private 
caucus, every vote in a leadership challenge can be examined for the first time. While the 
conventional view of leadership elections is that policy differences can fuel campaigns, this article 
argues that procedure is also important. Since it appears that the revolt was against the policies and 
practices of the speaker, party unity is hypothesized to impact the vote. Analysis supports this and 



































Shortly following the 2014 midterm elections, House Republicans caucused in private to 
decide who would represent their party in the election for speaker in January. The incumbent 
speaker, John Boehner, ran unopposed. However, this vote did not foreshadow an easy re-
nomination for Boehner when Congress met to vote for speaker. Twenty-five of Boehner’s fellow 
Republicans did not support him and scattered their votes among 13 different candidates.  
The unusualness of this scenario cannot be understated. In their definitive study of elections 
for the speakership, Jenkins and Stewart (2012) noted that, through 2010, a member of the majority 
party had voted for someone who was not the nominee of the caucus only once since 1925. The 
vote against Boehner was the largest challenge to an incumbent speaker from his own party since 
1860. What can help explain this type of intraparty revolt against the speaker? 
Such a public challenge to a sitting speaker from his or her own party has not been seen in 
modern times. However, a framework does exist to study the individual factors that influence 
leadership votes within a caucus: goal salience theory. Though never used to model the actual vote 
for speaker, this article will examine whether or not goal salience theory gives context and clarity 
to Boehner’s reelection.  
Goal salience theory emphasizes that legislators vote for candidates in leadership elections 
who can assist that legislator achieve her or his goals. These goals include reelection, the enactment 
of public policy, and internal advancement. Which goals are the most salient, however, are 
dependent upon the candidates and the substance of their campaigns. Given these conditions, it is 
worthwhile to analyze Boehner’s relationship with his party to see what may have motivated this 
protest against him.  
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In this case, however, there was little formal opposition to Boehner, and those that did run 
stressed that their campaigns were not against the sitting speaker but against authority itself. This 
is unique, as past challenges have historically been spearheaded by a distinct challenger. 
Republicans had increased their ranks over the previous three election cycles by tapping into a 
conservative and anti-status quo sentiment in the electorate. This fervor subsequently spread 
throughout much of the Republican caucus, which made life difficult for Boehner. Many of the 
speaker’s largest pieces of legislation had consistently been challenged from within his own party 
on both substantive and procedural grounds. 
In keeping with the three prongs of goal salience theory (reelection, public policy, internal 
advancement), it appears as if policy differences may be one of the primary motivators of the vote 
against Boehner. However, contrary to the conventional view in the literature, there may be two 
dimensions to 'the enactment of public policy' that is causing upheaval within the Republican 
caucus. Traditionally in the literature on intraparty challenges, members who are upset with 
policies wish that legislation was more ideological (Green 2008); therefore, it is hypothesized that 
increased conservatism will be associated with a decreased likelihood of supporting Boehner.  
However, Republicans may also object to how policy is being enacted. That is, these 
members of the House may not like that Boehner has tried to introduce bills without their consent 
or input. In other words, they object to the process of legislating. This implies that ideology alone 
would not be enough to capture this effect; it is possible that a legislator may agree with the content 
of a bill but disagree with its creation. Therefore, a measurement is needed to capture 
dissatisfaction with legislation that is not identical to ideological disagreement. To measure this, 
it is hypothesized that those with lower levels of party unity may be more likely to vote against 
Boehner for the speakership.  
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In order to analyze this vote, two new contributions are made to the literature on intraparty 
challenges. First, since the campaign against Boehner appeared to be based on policy and 
procedure, party unity will be used as an independent variable for the first time to model an 
intraparty challenge. In addition, past studies of leadership votes have had to rely on incomplete 
data sets. The votes were cast when parties would caucus in private, so scholars relied on archival 
data or public declarations of voting intentions. In contrast, this challenge was made during the 
actual vote for speaker. This allows for the entire population of votes in an intra-party challenge 
for speaker to be analyzed for the first time.  
 A logit model of vote choice among Republicans finds support for the hypothesis regarding 
party unity and for other hypotheses borrowed from the goal salience literature. These results 
suggest that goal salience theory is a useful framework for evaluating votes for speaker. In 
addition, the results of earlier studies on intraparty leadership elections receive further support as 
those findings that were based on partial data sets are corroborated. Furthermore, these results 
foreshadowed the unusual demise of Boehner’s speakership and suggest how Paul Ryan will 
operate in this environment, both of which are discussed in the conclusion of this article. 
This article will proceed as follows. First, the prior studies on votes for speaker and 
intraparty contests will be reviewed, followed by a close look at the challenge to Boehner. The 
hypotheses will be explored in more detail. The data will then be described and modeled, followed 
by a brief conclusion. 
 
Literature Review 
 Early studies on the vote for Speaker of the House focused on qualitative or anecdotal 
aspects of those elections. Hinds (1909) noted that the vote for speaker was different from almost 
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all other types of elections, because, “Most of those who elect a speaker know him personally...” 
(159). Peabody (1976) also focused on the personal characteristics of leaders, while Nelson (1977) 
was more concerned with party idiosyncrasies with regards to issues such as succession and 
challenges. Yet even these early studies noted that specific missteps may lead to a challenge; as 
was noted by Hinds (1909), a speaker may be replaced if he “betrays or mal-administers the trust” 
that was given to him or her (162).  
 The most rigorous review of voting for speaker comes from Jenkins and Stewart (2012). 
The authors studied every vote for speaker through 2010. In it, they lay out a theory they name 
“organizational cartel theory” to understand the development of the vote for speaker. They argue 
that the current system of election was introduced following the Civil War. Prior to this, numerous 
votes for speaker were contentious, as members of the House were influenced by their competing 
loyalties to both their party and to their region of the country. That is, differences between 
Democrats and Republicans may be felt as strongly as differences between northerners and 
southerners. However, a system quickly formalized once the Republicans were the only party in 
Congress. The party would caucus prior to the vote for speaker to decide on a nominee. Once the 
nominee had been decided, the vote for speaker then fell along party lines. The speaker would 
attempt to quell dissent and punish protesters through the subsequent granting and removal of 
committee assignments. 
 Though their work is impressive, the framework established by Jenkins and Stewart (2012) 
does not allow for a full understanding of the machinations that were taking place within 
Republicans during the vote for Boehner in 2015. Those authors found that contentious votes were 
due to the differences between the parties, but this study is interested in the conflict within a party. 
6




Therefore, it is worthwhile to turn to the literature on intraparty challenges to understand how 
Republicans voted for speaker. 
 The field of intraparty challenges laid rather dormant until it was revived by Green (2006) 
and Harris (2006). Green (2006) sought to develop a theory to explain challenges to incumbent 
speakers. First, Green (2006) emphasized that party leaders are perceived to assist legislators 
accomplish at least one of the following goals: secure reelection, further their policy goals, or 
increase their internal influence. Therefore, there should be a challenge to the leadership if a 
member feels that the speaker is not helping them in one of these important ways. Green (2006) 
then introduced a framework labeled goal salience theory. According to this theory, the candidates 
seeking a leadership position and their respective campaigns will highlight some combination of 
those three aforementioned variables. That is, whether or not reelection, policy goals, or internal 
influence will impact a intraparty challenge is dependent upon the environment of the election.  
For example, Green’s (2006) study focused on the challenge by Mo Udall to Speaker John 
McCormack within the Democratic Party in 1969. Given the liberal bent of Udall’s challenge as 
well as his pledge to assist younger members, it was hypothesized that ideology and age would be 
among the most important variables. Using an assortment of archival data to test the results of this 
secret ballot, support was found for these and additional hypotheses.  
Goal salience theory has guided much of the subsequent work in this field. For example, 
Green and Harris (2007) studied the 2006 House Republican majority leader’s race between John 
Boehner, Roy Blunt, and John Shadegg. Boehner and Shadegg positioned themselves as outsiders 
in their respective campaigns; unsurprisingly, the statistical analysis found that those who were 
elected in 1994 as part of the 'Gingrich Revolution' were more likely to support those two than 
Blunt. Green (2008) found that policy differences on abortion were a leading factor in Steny 
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Hoyer’s win over John Murtha for the position of Democratic majority leader in 2006, as Murtha 
was more pro-life than Hoyer and those with higher scores from the pro-choice group NARAL 
were more likely to support Hoyer. Frisch and Kelly (2008) also found that camaraderie was 
important in the Senate Republican whip race in 2006, as those who served with Trent Lott in the 
House were more likely to support him over Lamar Alexander than those who did not.  
These studies have tested goal salience theory in a variety of contexts in different eras, but 
there has been one constant throughout: the presence of a sustained and substantive opposition. 
These studies have only analyzed elections where there has been a serious contest for the position. 
To date, there has not been a study of a contest where there is no true campaign against an 
incumbent. Such a scenario would be a unique test of the theory that would serve to further 
highlight the importance of campaign context. 
Furthermore, all of these studies have relied on fragmented data. Leadership races have 
historically been conducted via secret ballot during a party caucus. Therefore, there is no public 
record of the vote. Data from past studies has relied on the personal tallies of candidates (Green, 
2006) or media reports of public declarations of support (Green, 2008; Frisch and Kelly, 2008) 
that have not included every individual vote. While there is little reason to suspect that legislators 
are not truthful in their pledges or that there are systematic differences between those who 
publicize their votes and those who do not, the lack of a complete data set of every single vote 
across all of these studies suggests that a full record could serve to bolster their conclusions. 









The 2015 Vote for Speaker of the House 
 Boehner was elected speaker when the Republicans gained the majority in the House in 
2010. While that election was relatively uncontroversial, there was an unusual public challenge to 
his post following the 2012 election when 11 Republicans voted against him. It appeared that that 
number may double when it came time to vote in 2015.  
 Speaker Boehner had been consistently flummoxed by a sizeable portion of his caucus. 
Starting in 2010, many Republicans came to Congress under the banner of the “Tea Party,” which 
has been argued to have been fueled by conservative and anti-establishment ideals; this put them 
at odds with their leadership. These members consistently decried both the procedure and 
substance of many pieces of legislation that were introduced by Boehner. For example, a “grand 
bargain” was negotiated behind closed doors by Boehner and President Obama in 2011 that would 
have greatly altered taxes and entitlements. However, the deal would have called for an increase 
in some taxes, which was anathema to many within the Republican caucus. There was worry that 
such a proposal “might lead to outright insurrection and a breakaway third party” (Bai, 2012). 
Boehner eventually walked away from the deal.  
A similar situation occurred in 2012 when Boehner attempted to pass a bill to avert going 
over the “fiscal cliff,” which was the nickname given to the simultaneous raising of taxes due to 
the expiration of tax cuts and reduced government spending due to sequestration that was due to 
take place in January 2013. First, a $2 trillion deal that would have increased taxes on millionaires 
and reduced entitlement spending while also lifting the debt ceiling was negotiated between 
Boehner and the White House. When word of the proposal leaked to his caucus, the subsequent 
protestations from his party led to it being quickly scuttled. Boehner’s “Plan B” was to focus only 
on taxes and then negotiate with the White House over spending. This bill sought to freeze income 
9
Bednarczuk: Boehner versus the GOP
Published by Scholar Commons, 2017
 
10 
taxes at their current levels for most people while allowing the rates to rise for millionaires. After 
ensuring the public that the bill would pass, Boehner had to pull it off of the floor shortly before 
the vote because not enough Republicans supported it (Kane, O’Keefe, and Montgomery, 2012).  
As 2014 came to a close, the anti-establishment wing of the House caucus was again a 
thorn in Boehner’s side. That November, President Barack Obama had taken extensive executive 
action regarding the deportation of undocumented immigrants. This outraged House Republicans 
on both political and procedural grounds. They felt that the spending bill that passed in December 
should have had provisions in it targeted at the enforcement of immigration laws, but Boehner 
ignored their pleas and instead promised to deal with immigration in 2015 (Sherman and 
Bresnahan 2015).  
Partially because he knew that the vote for speaker could be challenging, Boehner tried to 
make amends with many in his caucus. Aside from personally campaigning for them, Boehner 
also distributed money in amounts of either $5000 or $10,000 to many House Republicans. In all, 
Boehner’s Freedom Project PAC donated $1,225,000 to campaigns for the House (OpenSecrets; 
French and Bresnahan, 2015). 
After the November election, the Republicans held their caucus and voted on their nominee 
for speaker. Boehner ran unopposed. Following this vote, however, many Republicans expressed 
their displeasure with the party’s leadership and policies. Representative Dave Brat (R-VA), who 
had upset the sitting majority leader in a primary in 2014, wrote that, “Washington is broken in 
part because our party’s leadership has strayed from its own principles of free market, limited 
government, constitutional conservatism.” (Brat, 2015). Brat also expressed displeasure at the lack 
of time provided by the leadership to review legislation. In addition, Representative Walter Jones 
(R-NC), when asked why he supported a challenge to Boehner, said, “I want us to have [a] leader 
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who is willing to stand up for conservative, religious principles I believe in. It is to make a 
statement and it’s based on many months of consideration” (Book, 2015).  
Though many were publically displeased, there was little in the form of a formal campaign 
by any candidate against Boehner. Furthermore, the campaigning that did take place emphasized 
that the movement was not for anyone but was against the current leader’s style. Representative 
Ted Yoho (R-FL) declared on January 4 that he would run if no one else chose to challenge 
Boehner. Yoho, in a prepared statement, wrote, “The American People have spoken loud and clear 
by their choice to elect conservative Representatives to serve them in Washington. It’s our turn 
now, as Members of the People’s House, to echo their demands by electing a new Speaker.” 
However, Yoho went on to write that this challenge was not meant as an affront to the current 
speaker, stating, “Our vote for a new Speaker is not a personal vote against Representative Boehner 
- it is a vote against the status quo. Our vote is a signal to the American people that we too, have 
had enough of Washington politics, and that we will stand with the American people” (Boyle, 
2015).  
This sentiment was echoed by the second person to enter the race against Boehner, 
Representative Louie Gohmert (R-TX). In his statement, Gohmert stressed that, “...the Speaker’s 
election is not about a particular candidate. It is about whether we keep the status quo or make the 
change the country demands” (Gohmert, 2015). Following the election, Gohmert maintained this 
theme in an interview on “Fox and Friends,” where he stated, “As I said from the beginning, it was 
never about me, that’s why I urged Yoho to get in, that’s why I urged [Representative] Daniel 
Webster to get in, and was urging a couple others that didn’t...” (McCalmont, 2015).  
The third challenger, Representative Daniel Webster (R-FL), also had an unconventional 
campaign. Webster, who had served as speaker in the Florida legislature, gained the attention of 
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many conservatives following a November speech to the Republican Study Committee. Many of 
his fellow legislators urged him to run; however, Webster did not announce his campaign until the 
day before the vote. At the time that, he realized that he would be nominated for the position 
whether he announced or not. His “campaign” was so muddled that many were still unsure if he 
was actually running (French and Bresnahan, 2015). In keeping with the motivations of Yoho and 
Gohmert, Webster said afterwards, “In the end this is not personal. I was in this to try to influence 
the process. Done. John Boehner is a friend” (Leary, 2015).  
Though the campaigns against him may have been unconventional, Boehner still faced the 
largest challenge to a sitting speaker since the Buchanan Administration. Boehner needed a 
majority of all of the ballots cast to keep the speakership. Out of 408 ballots cast, 216 were for 
Boehner. While the Democratic caucus was largely united against him, a total of 25 Republicans 
did not vote for him. Among the declared Republican challengers, Webster was the leading vote-
getter with 12 votes. Gohmert was in second place with three votes while Yoho garnered two. The 
other votes were scattered among other Republican government officials (Sherman and Bresnahan, 
2015).  
Following his re-election, Boehner directly confronted the notion that he was too strongly 
tied to the status quo of Washington while also acting quickly against those who had opposed him. 
In a speech, he declared, “I’m the most anti-establishment speaker we’ve ever had.” Boehner cited 
the elimination of earmarks and his belief that all members of the House should participate in 
governing in support of this assertion (Sherman, 2015a). Additionally, two members of the House 
who voted against Boehner were removed from the powerful Rules Committee just hours after the 
formal vote. Boehner said that, “Because of some activities on the floor, two of our members 
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weren’t put back on the committee immediately” (Pappas, 2015). Those members were 
permanently replaced in April (Marcos, 2015).  
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Goal-salience theory suggests that the records of the candidates and the context of the 
campaign need to be considered when developing hypotheses. This campaign features a unique 
test of the theory because there was little sustained challenge by those running and much deference 
among the candidates towards each other and towards the incumbent speaker. Instead, those 
running against Boehner agitated against “Washington as usual” politics and desired more 
conservative legislation. Therefore, if there was a theme among the challengers, it was one of 
policy and procedure. Many House Republicans not only disapproved of the substance of 
Boehner’s bills, but they also disapproved of how he brought bills to the floor and therefore sought 
relief by voting against him. 
According to goal-salience theory, legislators have three primary goals. Those goals are 
re-election, public policy, and internal advancement. Given the context and nature of the 
campaigns against Boehner, all three prongs are relevant. 
Re-election is always a concern among elected officials. Therefore, Boehner used his 
ample campaign war chest to assist his caucus during the 2014 campaign season and to try to head 
off a challenge to his speakership. Earlier studies have found a link between campaign 
expenditures and leadership votes (Green and Harris, 2007); therefore, it is hypothesized that those 
who receive money from Boehner’s PAC will be more likely to vote for him.  
Internal advancement goals have traditionally been measured in two different ways to try 
to capture the competing goals at stake. This is because of differences between those in leadership 
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positions and those who are not: those that lack power wish to have it, while those who have it 
wish to keep it. Past studies have included variables to capture “cohort” effects (Green, 2006; 
Harris, 2006; Green and Harris, 2007). The logic behind such measurements is that members that 
are elected together at certain times seem to share a kindred spirit. Given the changes in the 
composition of the House, it is reasonable to assume that those who have been elected recently 
share a similar anti-authority belief. Therefore, it is hypothesized that newer members will be less 
likely to vote for Boehner.  
On the other hand, other studies have modeled inclusion in party leadership as a factor in 
leadership votes (Harris, 2006; Green, 2008). Those that are in power have historically supported 
the status quo. Since this is a challenge fueled by protest, it is hypothesized that those that are the 
heads of committees or in the party leadership will be more likely to support Boehner. 
Past studies of leadership votes have tried to model public policy displeasure in two ways: 
ideological extremity (Harris, 2006; Green, 2006; Green and Harris, 2007) or by positions on 
specific policies (Green, 2008). Given that many legislators wanted bills that were more 
conservative, ideology appears to be an appropriate variable to use in modeling. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that increased conservatism is associated with an increased probability of voting 
against Boehner.  
Aside from ideological considerations, many of the speaker’s largest pieces of legislation 
had consistently been challenged from within his own party on based on procedural grounds. Many 
House Republicans were opposed to the deal-making between Boehner and Obama and felt left 
out of the legislative process. Therefore, while these members may have agreed with the substance 
of the bill, they did not agree with the process. If this is so, then ideological extremity will not 
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capture this particular effect. What is needed is variable that measures displeasure with legislation 
but is not merely a substitute for ideology.  
If those who voted against Boehner for speaker did so to voice their displeasure with how 
he negotiated policies, it is likely that this same behavior manifested itself in other ways. One of 
the most public ways of making such a protest would be by voting against legislation that was 
proposed by Boehner. That is, House Republicans may have protested against “Washington as 
usual” politics by their earlier votes against their own party. This dissention within House 
Republicans implies that those with lower levels of party unity may be more likely to vote against 
Boehner for the speakership. This variable hopefully captures dislike for how legislation is crafted. 
By consistently refusing to “go along to get along,” it is hypothesized that those who voted against 
the wishes of their party with greater frequency were also more likely to vote against Boehner.   
 
Data 
Previous tests of goal-salience theory relied on incomplete data sets. Leadership votes are 
always conducted in secret, so the actual votes by legislators are never revealed. Therefore, past 
studies used archival data from the personal papers of the candidates (Green, 2006; Harris, 2006) 
or publicly declared votes (Green and Harris, 2007; Green, 2008; Frisch and Kelly, 2008). Though 
many of the studies could not model every legislator’s vote, the authors often argued strenuously 
and convincingly that their inferences were sound. 
This study, on the other hand, analyzes intraparty conflict using the public vote for speaker. 
This election was aired live on CSPAN and every vote was recorded. For the first time, analysis 
using goal salience theory will include all of the votes with no question pertaining to their veracity. 
Therefore, the dependent variable in this analysis will be whether or not a Republican voted for or 
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against Boehner. There were 216 votes in support of Boehner from his own caucus, with 25 votes 
against him. 
The independent variables come from myriad sources and descriptive statistics may be 
found in the appendix. Ideology, in the tradition of earlier studies in the literature (Green 2006), 
will be measured using first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores from the prior Congress. This 
measure takes the votes made by members of Congress and then places the members along an 
ideological spectrum based on how often legislators vote with one another Larger scores are 
associated with increased conservatism. This variable ranged from a low of 0.176 to a high of 
0.636. Party unity scores come from OpenCongress, a product of the nonpartisan non-profit 
Sunlight Foundation. It records how often an individual member voted with a majority of other 
Republicans and includes every vote taken during the prior Congress. This variable ranged from 
75.1 to 98.2. Information regarding those who received money from Boehner’s PAC (Freedom 
Project) comes from OpenSecrets.org and is dummy coded. Of the 197 members of Congress that 
are analyzed, data on leadership membership and years served in Congress comes from 
Congressional Quarterly.  
 
Analysis and Results 
Since the dependent variable for this analysis is dichotomous, a logit model is used. Since 
they did not have party unity scores nor measures of ideology, this model omits freshman. A 
description of a separate analysis on freshman is discussed later in the article. Four additional 
members were excluded: Clawson (FL), Graves (LA) and Brat (VA) because they joined the 
previous Congress late and did not have ideology nor party unity scores; and Guinta (NH) who 
was not a freshman but did not serve in the previous Congress.  
16




Given that the estimated proportional reduction in error (ePRE) of the model is upwards of 
25%, it is suggested that this model improves upon the naive model. Diagnostic tests suggest no 
evidence of multicollinearity. Most importantly, this model lends support for almost every 
proposed hypothesis. Since interpreting a logistic regression table is not intuitive, this section will 
detail the findings.  
 
Table One: Logit Model for Vote against Boehner 
 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. 
   
Party Unity -0.290 0.065 
Ideology 6.465 2.316 
Seniority 0.122 0.041 
Freedom Project PAC -1.215 0.673 
Constant -223.03 80.105 
   
N 197  
McFadden's R^2 0.306  
ePCP 86.9  
ePRE 27.93  
Note: All variables significant at the 0.05-level (one-tail) are in bold 
 
First, those in positions of power were unanimous in their support for Boehner, so that 
variable was not included in the model. Everyone that served in the leadership or as the chair of a 
committee voted for Boehner. This provides support for the hypothesis that those in the leadership 
fought to preserve the status quo and did not protest. 
Those Republicans who were more conservative than the rest of their party were also more 
likely to vote for someone other than Boehner. For a standard deviation increase in conservatism, 
the odds of supporting anyone but Boehner are 2.05 times as great, holding all other variables 
constant. This gives support to the hypothesis that suggests that those who are more conservative 
would be less likely to support Boehner. 
17
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In addition, it is also apparent that Boehner’s PAC wielded an influence as well, as those 
who received a donation from the speaker were more likely to support him. All else constant, with 
a donation for Boehner’s PAC, the odds of supporting him for speaker are 0.30 times greater. This 
supports the re-election hypothesis that those who received campaign money from Boehner would 
be more likely to support him. Seniority also impacted the vote; those who had been in Congress 
longer were more likely to vote for Boehner.  
The results up to this point bolster the findings from past studies of intraparty leadership 
votes. These variables had been in prior studies, but this is the first time that they had been 
examined using a complete data set of every single vote. This support for earlier findings helps to 
confirm the robustness of earlier work in addition to the applicability of this framework to analyze 
a vote for speaker. 
Most importantly for this study, there is strong support for the unique hypothesis regarding 
party unity. Those who voted less often with their party were also less likely to vote for Boehner. 
Specifically, for a standard deviation decrease in party unity, the odds of supporting Boehner 
decrease by a factor of 0.39, holding all else constant. Party unity as measured by Poole and 
Rosenthal was substituted for this measure and the results were substantively similar. This supports 
the hypothesis that those who were upset by the procedures of the leadership during the previous 
term continued to voice their displeasure when they voted for the speakership. 
This result is also presented graphically in Figure One, which plots the predicted 
probability of supporting Boehner given a member’s level of party unity. As can be seen, the effect 
is quite dramatic. Among those who supported the party over 90% of the time, the predicted 
probability of voting against Boehner is almost zero. However, that quickly changes; as party unity 
drops to only 75%, the lowest score of any House Republican, the predicted probability of voting 
18




for Boehner is close to zero. This provides strong support that this variable captures a unique part 
of the protest against Boehner’s tactics. 
Figure One: Party Unity on the Probability of Voting against Boehner 
 
 
A model with all of these independent variables requires a representative to have served in 
Congress; therefore, all of the freshman are dropped from analysis. Therefore, an additional 
omitted model was tested that only included freshman. The most interesting information comes 
from an analysis of Boehner’s PAC contributions. Of the 41 freshman, Boehner’s PAC contributed 
to 37 of them. Unexpectedly, the four that did not receive money all supported Boehner. In a logit 
model of vote choice, this variable predicts failure perfectly and must be dropped. Broadly 
speaking, this suggests that these PAC donations may not have much influence on the leadership 
votes of freshman members of Congress. 
Other variables have been included in previous studies leadership votes, but since the 
framework established by goal-salience theory did not suggest that they would have an impact, 
they were not expected to have an effect. Those include: age (Green, 2006); region (Green and 
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Party Unity Score
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suggest that region may matter. These variables were tested and found to not be significant, so 
they have been omitted.  
It may be argued that a more direct measure of the protestations of the Republican caucus, 
such as membership within the Tea Party caucus is warranted. However, as noted by Gervais and 
Morris (2014), it is difficult to identify members of the Tea Party in Congress because the Tea 
Party Caucus is dormant. Gervais and Morris (2014) categorized Tea Party membership using 
campaign contributions, endorsements, activism on Twitter, membership in the Tea Party Caucus, 
Tea Party self-identification on social media, and news media references. The results suggested 
four different categories of Tea Party membership. These four categories were included in a model, 
as was membership in the Tea Party caucus, and none were significant 
It may be argued that the partisanship of the representative’s districts should also be 
modeled. It could be the case that the members of Congress were simply responding to the 
preferences of their constituents. This was measured in three ways: as the percent of the district 
that voted for the Democratic nominee in 2012, 2008, and the average of the two years. These 
variables were never significant and were omitted. 
 
Discussion 
During the fiscal cliff negotiations, Boehner’s job was likened to “herding cats” (Parker 
and Peters, 2013). That analogy could aptly describe his tenure as speaker. Though a significant 
portion of House Republicans objected during the vote in 2015, Boehner held on to his position. 
However, he was not in power for long. In September of 2015, Boehner announced that he would 
soon be resigning from his position. There was a threat of a “no-confidence vote” that had the 
support of numerous members of the Republican caucus. If the vote had been successful, Boehner 
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may have had to rely on the votes of Democrats to retain his speakership, which would not have 
been a sure bet.  
What does this study tell us about Boehner’s departure from the speakership? Based on 
these results, his departure was not unexpected. The “no-confidence vote” was first floated by 
Representative Mark Meadows in July. Meadows resolution had little to do with Boehner the 
person and much to do with Boehner the leader. Meadows noted that Boehner had “endeavored to 
consolidate power and centralize decision-making, bypassing the majority of the 435 Members of 
Congress and the people they represent” (Miller 2015). Therefore, this was a protest much in line 
with the policy and politics strain of Boehner’s earlier vote for speaker.  
Meadows was a member of a group that formed shortly into the 114th Congress named the 
House Freedom Caucus. This group almost perfectly encapsulates those who would be the most 
likely to oppose Boehner based on the results from this study. Fifteen of their members voted 
against Boehner in the 2015 vote for speaker. Their members are more conservative and have less 
seniority than the average Republican in the House (Bialik and Bycoffe 2015). However, their 
protestations are not solely fueled by ideology. Rather, the crux of the groups appears to be 
dissatisfaction with procedure. Representative Justin Amash, a founding member of the Freedom 
Caucus, said with regards to Boehner that, “the problem isn’t that he isn’t conservative enough. 
The problem is he doesn't follow the process” (Sherman 2015b). Amash stated that the group 
simply wants the House to follow the rules of the institution. “In some cases, conservative 
outcomes will succeed. In other cases, liberal outcomes will succeed. And that’s OK,” said Amash. 
“The worst scenario is where you have one person or a small group of people dictate to everyone 
else what the outcome is going to be in advance” (Sherman 2015b).  
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Informed by this paper, the difficulties that were caused by the Freedom Caucus for 
Boehner would hardly be unexpected. Based not only on their demographics, but on the clearly 
stated purpose for the existence of the group based on dissatisfaction with process, it could have 
been anticipated that the Freedom Caucus would not make life easy for Boehner. This suggests 
that the ideas introduced and furthered in this study may be relevant in analyzing other similar 
scenarios.  
What does this work suggest for the speaker who succeeded Boehner, Representative Paul 
Ryan? Prior to his election to speaker, Ryan appeared to seriously consider the demands of the 
Freedom Caucus. Following a meeting with them, Ryan gained the support of a supermajority of 
the caucus. It appears as if this may be due to Ryan agreeing with the premise of the group. 
According to the leader of the group, Representative Jim Jordan, “We do have a commitment from 
Paul to work on changing the rules...” (Scanlon 2015). If Ryan is able to successfully satiate the 
institutional demands of the group, he may not have the same fate as his predecessor.  
 
Conclusion 
The leadership vote examined in this article was unique due to the public nature of the 
agitation towards Boehner and the availability of data. Studies of past leadership votes have relied 
on the goal-salience theory, but this vote included a component that was lacking in all earlier 
studies: a public election. The history of Boehner’s speakership also suggested the inclusion of a 
new variable: party unity. This variable was large and impactful, suggesting that future studies 
should consider including a past history of individual dissention in their models. Furthermore, this 
unique scenario provided a strong test of the goal-salience theory. Since it proved to be adaptable, 
this study provides further verification of its usefulness. Most importantly, the results of this study 
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do not greatly differ from those in past studies, which suggests that those studies should not be 
ignored due to their incomplete data. 
This study suggests that no leadership vote should be seen as perfunctory nor 
unexplainable. If there is measurable dissention in the caucus during the previous Congress on 
policy or procedural grounds, a challenge may be expected. Even if no actual challenger steps up 
against the incumbent leader, there is now little reason to suspect that a protest vote will not take 
place. In addition, if future caucuses prove to be unwieldy and break from the party often, there is 
little reason to suspect that such challenges will not become more commonplace. What remains to 
be seen is if and how the leadership chooses to respond to these intraparty insurrections. Will the 
leadership propose more ideologically extreme bills? Will legislators have a greater say in policy? 
Will there be greater turnover within the leadership? It will be interesting to see what strategies 
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Table Two: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean  Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Vote 242 0.103 0.305 0 1 
Party Unity 197 93.516 3.269 75.1 98.2 
Ideology 197 0.439 0.111 0.171 0.67 
Year 242 2008 7.645 1973 2015 
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